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announced during periods of high monetary policy uncertainty are associated with 
significant declines in acquirer value. This negative market reaction reflects a unique 
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Monetary policy is widely understood to affect the cost of financing (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992; Jiménez et al., 2012) and the informational content of asset prices 
(Beaudry et al., 2001; Tommasi, 1994). In influencing the direction of the economy, 
monetary policymakers generally operate under few constraints and have a far-reaching 
impact compared to other policymakers (Taylor, 2000). For example, in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, central banks engaged in unprecedented monetary expansions, 
significantly expanded their balance sheets, and lowered short term interest rates to zero 
for a considerable period of time, with very limited political resistance (Maggio and 
Kacperczyk, 2017). In addition, monetary policy can complicate resource allocation 
decisions, encourage risk-taking, and build hidden sources of risk that eventually raise 
financing challenges for investors (Beaudry et al., 2001; Jiménez et al., 2014; Maggio and 
Kacperczyk, 2017; Tommasi, 1994). Moreover, the decisions of monetary policymakers 
have different effects across regions (Carlino and DeFina, 1998) and sectors (Jansen et 
al., 2013), leading to significant consequences on the investment and financing 
opportunities available to firms. 
As a result, monetary policy is unlikely to be ignored when corporate managers 
assess new investment opportunities and, in particular, when considering their 
involvement in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) transactions. Undoubtedly, M&As 
represent a major form of corporate investment, expansion, and restructuring that is 
valuation-complex, financially demanding, and informationally intense (Eckbo, 2009). 
Moreover, the synergies of M&As are highly dependent on the prevailing state of the 
overall economy, which is heavily influenced by monetary policy decisions (Galí and 
Gambetti, 2015; Summers, 2014). 
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Recent studies suggest that policy uncertainty incentivizes acquirers to be more 
prudent when designing M&As (Bonaime et al., 2018; Nguyen and Phan, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the direct impact of monetary policy conditions on (a) equity investors’ 
assessment of the value potential of M&As, (b) the riskiness of such value potential, (c) 
the likelihood of M&A completion, and (d) the overall M&A synergies, remains to be 
thoroughly studied. Based on the analysis of a comprehensive sample covering 12,350 
domestic U.S. public, private, and subsidiary target M&As announced between January 1986 and December 2017 − a period of considerable variation in monetary policy in the 
U.S. − we uncover two channels through which variations in monetary policy can 
influence M&A outcomes. 
Our first channel is the “expected financing cost” channel. A well-established result 
in the monetary policy literature suggests that monetary tightening increases the cost of 
financing and reduces the viability of corporate investments (Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992; Bougheas et al., 2006; Jiménez et al., 2012). Therefore, our “expected financing 
cost” channel predicts that tight monetary policy at the time of M&A announcements 
poses future financing challenges for merging firms (Beck et al., 2008; Ozkan, 2001). 
Given that M&As exhaust significant financial resources (Moeller et al., 2005), post-
acquisition financing of future business operations becomes highly dependent on access 
to external financing. We therefore predict that, in a contractionary monetary 
environment, M&A announcements tend to be negatively perceived by equity investors, 
especially when acquirers are financially constrained at the time of M&A announcements. 
We also predict that acquirers investing significant resources in M&As during 
contractionary monetary periods experience an increase in their post-acquisition 




We use two proxies to reflect the impact of monetary policy via the “expected 
financing cost” channel: (a) the level of federal funds rate (FFR), and (b) the deviation of 
FFR from the natural interest rate – as estimated by Laubach and Williams (2003).1 Our 
tests show a negative relation between the FFR at the time of the M&A announcement 
and acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). More specifically, a one percentage 
point increase in FFR (or in the deviation of FFR from the natural rate) in the quarter preceding the deal’s announcement is, on average, associated with a 0.20% decrease in 
the acquirer CAR. We show that the FFR effect on acquirer CAR remains statistically and 
economically significant after controlling for the effects of financial market uncertainty 
using the VIX index as in Bhagwat et al. (2016) and overall uncertainty in the economy 
using the composite leading index estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
This negative market reaction is particularly driven by investors’ concerns about a rise 
in future financing costs that the acquirer will potentially face in a contractionary 
monetary environment. Supporting this explanation, we find that the negative 
relationship between the level of FFR and the acquirer CAR is particularly evident in deals 
that are announced by highly leveraged acquirers as well as those having low cash ratios. 
Furthermore, we show that the rise in FFR is a key predictor of the deterioration in the acquirer’s post-acquisition performance: a one percentage point increase in FFR is 
associated with a 1.5% reduction in the acquirer’s post-acquisition Return on Assets 
(RoA). A rise in FFR is also associated with an increase in the acquirer’s indebtedness, a 
reduction in its cash (to assets) ratio and a rise in its cost of debt. We also show that deals 
announced during periods of monetary contraction are associated with a significant decline in the acquirer’s post-acquisition Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR). 
                                                             
1 The measures are updated frequently on John Williams’s Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco webpage. This 
measure is derived from a frequently updated state space model in which the natural rate of interest is the state 
variable ensuring that the realized output is equal to its potential level while preserving price stability. 
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Our second monetary policy channel is a “real options” channel which assesses the 
impact of monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) on a wide range of M&A outcomes. The “real options” framework considers irreversible investments as equivalent to financial 
call options that can be either exercised or delayed at any point in time (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Kellog, 2014). As long as the investment is not undertaken, the firm holds a “wait 
and see” option as it awaits the arrival of new information to adjust its investment plans 
(Kelly, 1991). As in the case of financial option valuation, a rise in market uncertainty 
increases the value of the option to “wait and see”. Other things being equal, rising MPU 
should encourage firms to delay major investments such as M&As (Bhagwat et al., 2016; 
Bonaime et al., 2018). This is especially due to the far-reaching influence of monetary 
policy on the economic environment in which merging firms aim to realize their synergies 
(Carlino and DeFina, 1998; Summers, 2014).2 
Along these lines, acquirers that abandon the option to “wait and see” and proceed 
with an acquisition face significant business risk, and equity investors should demand a 
significant discount for holding the acquirers’ shares. Our results support this 
proposition. We find that an increase in the MPU index developed by Baker et al. (2016) 
(hereafter BBD index) at the time of the deal’s announcement is a significant predictor of 
the decrease in the acquirer CAR. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the 
news-based MPU index of Baker et al. (2016) at the time of the deal’s announcement is, 
on average, associated with a 0.40% decline in the acquirer CAR. We also find that deals 
announced under high MPU tend to cause higher volatility in the acquirer returns than 
                                                             
2 Beaudry et al. (2001) and Tommasi (1994) argue that price instability adversely affects the allocation of investments 
through a depreciating effect on the informational content of asset prices. High MPU is expected to distort price signals 
in asset markets, make investment opportunities difficult to forecast, and ultimately lead to misallocation of 
investments (similarly to Beaudry et al., 2001). This is also likely to defer investments at a future date. We embed this 
result in the market for corporate control. We argue that price instability triggered by high MPU limits the acquirer’s 
ability to accurately forecast and evaluate takeover synergies and, hence, M&As announced within high MPU 
environments should be value-destroying for acquirers, at least in the short run. 
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deals announced under low MPU. Nevertheless, in line with the traditional risk-return 
paradigm, we find that acquirers manage to overcome these challenges to deliver 
significant gains in the post-acquisition period. This result supports the view that MPU 
and its related risks are short-lived (Byrne and Davis, 2004) and do not deter companies 
from attempting to engage in value-enhancing investment (Kang et al., 2014). 
We also investigate the extent to which monetary policy considerations influence 
both the premium and the choice of contractual tools used in M&As. Specifically, we find 
that high MPU reduces the bargaining power of the acquirer and consequently results in 
an increase in the takeover premium. Moreover, high MPU during the due diligence period reduces the target’s commitment to the deal, as evidenced by the limited inclusion 
of target termination fee provisions. This result is aligned with the influential body of 
literature suggesting that the inclusion (absence) of a termination fee provision reflects 
a weak (strong) bargaining position for the target firm (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Boone 
and Mulherin, 2007; Officer, 2003).3 Our results further show that a tight monetary policy – because it raises concerns about the acquirer’s future financing and liquidity positions – reduces the likelihood of the use of deferred (or earnout) payments (Barbopoulos and 
Adra, 2016; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000). 
Our results highlighting the significant impact of FFR on M&A outcomes are highly 
consequential from the perspectives of both policymakers and scholars interested in the monetary policy’s transmission channels. A growing strand of studies examines how 
monetary transmission mechanisms can operate via the corporate financing and 
investment decisions (Bolton and Freixas, 2006; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019; Liu et 
al., 2018). Our M&A-based findings add a new corporate channel via which monetary 
                                                             
3 It is worth noting that the literature focused on the wealth effects of termination fee provisions in M&As does not 
examine the influence of policy uncertainty on the use of such contractual tools. 
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policy influences economic activity. Given that the size of the recent merger wave is 
equivalent to almost 15% of the annual U.S. Gross Domestic Product (Alexandridis et al., 
2017), the direct impact of monetary policy decisions on the market for corporate control 
should not be overlooked by monetary policymakers. Another direct implication of our “expected financing cost” channel is that corporations, especially those in 
disadvantageous leverage and liquidity positions, must display prudence when engaging 
in M&As in a contractionary monetary environment. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first direct examination of the 
link between MPU at the time of the deal announcement and the wealth effects of M&As. 
It is worth noting that the size of the MPU discount is generally unique: there is no 
equivalent discount associated with the uncertainties related to fiscal, regulatory, and 
trade policies, among others. This uniqueness emphasizes the relevance of MPU as a 
distinctive and influential source of corporate risk, beyond the challenges posed by 
general policy concerns. 
Prior studies provide alternative conclusions. Bonaime et al. (2018) report a 
univariate analysis suggesting that the acquirer announcement period CAR does not 
differ between high and low policy uncertainty periods. By contrast, Nguyen and Phan 
(2017) report multivariate evidence suggesting that high policy uncertainty in the period 
leading to the acquisition announcement incentivizes acquirers to proceed with only 
value-enhancing acquisitions. In their online appendix, they also show that part of the 
BBD index that is based on the level of disagreement in the forecasts of government 
spending and Consumer Price Index (CPI), which Baker et al. (2016) attribute to the 
uncertainty surrounding fiscal and monetary policies, is a significant predictor of the rise 
in the acquirer CAR. 
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Our paper differs from Nguyen and Phan (2017) in two key aspects. First, instead of 
focusing on the aggregate BBD index that combines fiscal and monetary uncertainties, 
our empirical analysis focuses on the news-based index that exclusively reflects 
monetary policy concerns. This direct approach is relevant as Boero et al. (2008) – and 
subsequently Rich and Tracy (2010) – cast doubts on the usefulness of CPI forecast 
disagreements in reflecting MPU. 
Second, our analysis separates MPU during the period leading to the deal’s 
announcement from the level of MPU prevailing at the time of this announcement. Our 
findings add a new dimension by showing that, despite the acquirers’ prudence in assessing their deals’ prospects in the face of uncertainty, the prevalence of MPU at the time of the deal’s announcement makes equity investors highly cautious in assessing the 
M&A prospects. This finding testifies to the relevant and unique influence of monetary 
policy. 
The final part of the paper applies a time series analysis of the impact of monetary 
policy on the aggregate M&A activity. Both Kang et al. (2014) and Gulen and Ion (2016) 
find no effect of the BBD index component that combines monetary and fiscal 
uncertainties on corporate investment. Our results support these findings in the realm of 
M&A by showing that it is general policy uncertainty, rather than MPU per se, that 
contributes to the decline in M&A activity. Nevertheless, a tight monetary policy – by 
increasing the cost of investment financing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992; Jiménez et al., 2012; Kashyap et al., 1993) and reducing the aggregate 
economic output (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Romer and Romer, 1989) – reduces the 
value prospect of M&As. Our VAR model shows that FFR is a significant contributor to the 
decline in aggregate M&A activity after controlling for the prevailing level of MPU and a 
wide range of economic factors. Moreover, the impulse response analysis suggests that a 
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rise in FFR predicts a decline in the aggregate value of announced M&As for the following 
five quarters. 
This result has direct implications for the body of research that focuses on the 
determinants of aggregate M&A activity (Harford, 2005; Maksimovic et al., 2013; 
Rhodes–Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). While prior research 
focuses on the role of stock market valuations, technological shocks, and regulatory 
factors in influencing M&A activity, our results are the first to emphasize the influential 
role of the variation of FFR. In so doing, our results establish a novel link between two 
rich – yet mostly non-overlapping – areas of study that focus on M&As and monetary 
policy, respectively. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the M&A dataset, as well as the 
proxies we use to capture the stance of the monetary policy; Section 3 presents our 
results from the univariate and multivariate tests; Section 4 presents results from our 
time series analysis; and finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1. The M&A dataset 
Our M&A dataset covers 12,350 U.S. public, private, and subsidiary target 
acquisitions announced by U.S. public companies between January 1, 1986 and December 
31, 2017, and recorded by the Thomson ONE Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. 
As in Adra and Barbopoulos (2018), our analysis is executed on domestic deals in order 
to ensure that both merging firms operate within the same economic, legal, and 
institutional frameworks. Leveraged buyouts, government-funded takeovers, 
acquisitions of government entities, going-private deals, spinoffs, privatizations, self-
tenders, and reverse takeovers are excluded from the sample. As in prior studies 
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(Alexandridis et al., 2013; Barbopoulos et al., 2018), we require the acquirer to own less 
than 10% of the target shares before the acquisition announcement and to aim to control 
more than 50% of the target shares after the deal’s completion. We keep only deals with 
transaction values, excluding fees, in excess of $1m, as well as acquirers with market 
capitalization (available from COMPUSTAT and CRSP) in excess of $1m. We also exclude 
deals announced by the same acquirer within a five-day window. Finally, we impose the 
restriction that the method of payment (stock, cash, a combo of cash and stock, or 
alternative payment arrangements) is available in SDC. 
Table 1 presents the annual distribution of all M&As, which is further divided according to the target firm’s listing status, deal’s completion status, and deal’s payment 
method, as well as acquirer and target industry relatedness. The overall M&A activity 
follows a pro-cyclical pattern, with notable peaks in the late 1980s and late 1990s, as well 
as in the mid-2000s, in addition to significant declines in the aftermath of the dotcom 
bubble and the 2008 financial crisis. In our sample, 12% of the deals are withdrawn, 
which is comparable to the corresponding statistics reported in prior studies (Kau et al., 
2008; Luo, 2005). More than half of our deals are private target acquisitions, with the 
remaining ones evenly split between public and subsidiary targets. Moreover, 41% of the 
deals are settled in mixed payments of cash and stock, while the deals fully settled in cash 
and in stock represent 32% and 27% of the sample, respectively. Sector-wise, 
untabulated statistics show that the hi-tech sector has the biggest share of deals (21%), 
while the real estate sector represents only 1% of all M&As. Finally, 37% (63%) of the 
deals are industry diversifying (focused). 





2.2. The interest rate dataset 
We use two proxies to reflect the impact of monetary policy on M&A outcomes via 
the expected financing cost channel: (a) the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and (b) the deviation of FFR from the “natural rate of interest” – as measured by Laubach and 
Williams (2003). 
Building on the seminal work by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), FFR has become the most widely used measure of monetary policy’s stance. We follow the convention of 
treating variations in the policy-set funds rate as an indicator of the variation in the monetary policy’s stance. For each deal, the level of the FFR in the quarter preceding the deal’s announcement is used as a proxy for the monetary policy’s direction. 
We use the interest rate variable developed by Laubach and Williams (2003) as a 
proxy for the natural interest rate. The method used in estimating this variable is based on the traditional view of Wicksell that “there is a certain rate of interest on loans which 
is neutral in respect to commodity prices, and tends neither to raise nor to lower them” 
(Wicksell, 1936, p.36). Accordingly, the estimates of the natural rate in Laubach and 
Williams (2003) are the result of a simple – yet robust – state space model in which the 
deviation of the policy-set rate from the natural rate is a key contributor to the variation 
in the output gap. Laubach and Williams (2003) model the dynamics of inflation and output within a restricted VAR by jointly estimating an “unobservable” natural interest 
rate, potential output, and trend growth rate series. Their model explains the variations 
in the output gap and the inflation rate in terms of the lagged effects of these state 
variables using both the Kalman filter and the Stock and Watson (1998) median-unbiased 
estimator. The advantage of their methodology is that it does not involve a priori 
theoretical models or structural equations while, at the same time, allowing for a time-
varying natural rate which can be used in the assessment of policy rules. The authors 
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provide both one-sided and two-sided estimates of the natural rate. The one-sided 
estimates at time 𝑡 are based solely on information available at time 𝑡 without using data 
from subsequent periods. The two-sided estimates, however, are generated by a two-
sided filter that uses data from both before and after time 𝑡 to compute expected values 
of the natural rate. 
Figure 1 shows the variation in the policy-set FFR and the two-sided smoothed 
estimate of the natural interest rate. For the period between 1961 and the end of 2001, 
the graph depicts the same variations discussed in Laubach and Williams (2003). This 
graph highlights key periods of relatively easy monetary policy in the early 1960s, 
monetary tightening to combat inflationary pressures in the 1970s and early 1980s, and 
limited monetary easing in the mid-1990s. Figure 1 also depicts a considerable degree of 
monetary easing in the early 2000s, which is in line with the widely held view that 
monetary policy was excessively loose after the burst of the dotcom bubble. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
Moreover, Figure 1 shows that both the natural and the policy-set rates have been 
downward sloping up to the point where they have converged at substantially low rates. 
This noticeable decline is treated as an indicator of a dramatic change in macroeconomic 
environment, as a zero lower bound prevents monetary policy from achieving its 
objectives and raises the necessity for demand-driven policies. Furthermore, low interest 
rates with low inflation incentivize investors to take riskier and more financially 
destabilizing positions (Summers, 2014). 
In our analysis, we use the difference between FFR and the two-sided smoothed 
natural interest rate as a measure of the monetary policy’s stance. This approach provides 
a new interpretation for monetary shocks. A positive (negative) difference indicates the 
presence of an excessively expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy. 
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2.3. Monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) 
In estimating the impact of policy uncertainty on investment decisions, previous 
research (Bonaime et al., 2018; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Kang et al., 2014; Nguyen and Phan, 
2017) employs the BBD index developed by Baker et al. (2016). This index is the 
normalized weighted average of three components: (a) a scaled news-based factor 
constructed using the number of news articles containing uncertainty-related keywords (such as “uncertain,” “White House,” “Congress,” and “Regulation”), (b) a measure based 
on the discounted value of the revenue impacts associated with tax provisions set to 
expire in the near future, and (c) an estimate of the dispersion in economic forecasts 
related to government spending and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Baker et al. (2016) 
attribute the variation in the latter component to the uncertainty driven by concerns 
related to fiscal and monetary policies.4 
Baker et al. (2016) also construct a rich set of news-based indices that directly 
quantify the level of uncertainty associated with each policy category. For instance, the 
categorical index used as a direct proxy for MPU is based on the frequency of keywords such as “federal reserve,” “the fed,” “open market operations,” and “quantitative easing” 
used in the Access World News database, which covers over 2,000 U.S. newspapers. 
Similarly, the categorical news-based index used as a direct proxy of fiscal policy 
uncertainty is constructed by tracking the mentions of terms such as “government 
spending,” “federal budget,” “budget battle,” “balanced budget,” and “fiscal stimulus.” In 
addition to monetary and fiscal policy uncertainty subcategories, Baker et al. (2016) 
construct news-based indices for taxes/government spending, healthcare, national 
security, entitlement programs, regulation, financial regulation, trade policy, sovereign 
                                                             
4 In calculating the aggregate policy uncertainty index, the first component is assigned a weight of 1/2, the second 
component is assigned a weight of 1/6, and the third component is assigned a weight of 1/3. 
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debt, and currency crises. Each categorical series is normalized to have a mean of 100. 
The reader can consult Baker et al. (2016) and the website 
(http://www.policyuncertainty.com/) for a detailed description of the construction of 
each of these indices. 
Figure 2 presents the time variation in the general policy uncertainty index of Baker 
et al. (2016) and the news-based monetary policy index, both available on the webpage 
(www.policyuncertainty.com). Despite the predictable positive correlation between 
these two indices, Figure 2 shows that MPU experienced a significant spike compared to 
general policy uncertainty during the period following the October 1987 stock market 
crash. Closer patterns are also present in the aftermath of the dot com bubble. Moreover, 
while MPU stabilized between 2011 and 2013 as the Federal Reserve clarified its 
response to the financial crisis, general policy uncertainty reached an all-time high. Baker 
et al. (2016) attribute the spike in the latter uncertainty to events such as the fiscal cliff 
dispute, the debt ceiling debate, and the U.S. government shutdown. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
In assessing the impact of policy uncertainty on M&A outcomes, previous research 
uses the policy uncertainty levels for an extended period preceding an acquisition’s 
announcement. In their analysis of the effect of policy uncertainty on the acquirer CAR, 
Nguyen and Phan (2017) use the average level of the BBD index for the three calendar 
months at the end of the calendar year preceding the announcement of the M&A. In their 
robustness checks, they also include the average level of the policy uncertainty index for 
the three months preceding an acquisition’s announcement. However, it is important to 
note that the level of MPU varies significantly in the short term (Byrne and Davis, 2004). 
Given that our analysis aims to uncover the impact of MPU at the time of the deal’s 
announcement on M&A outcomes - including the acquirer announcement period CAR - 
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we construct the variable “Announcement MPU”. If the deal is announced after (before) 
the 15th of a given calendar month, the “Announcement MPU” variable is assigned the 
value of the BBD news-based MPU index for the same (previous) calendar month. This 
approach ensures that our analysis controls for the effect of MPU on the market’s reaction 
to a deal’s announcement in a timely fashion. It is worth noting that our results do not 
change qualitatively or quantitatively if either the 10th or 20th day of the month is used as 
the cut-off date. 
To ensure that our analysis controls for the effect of the MPU on the design and 
structuring of the deal, we also construct the variable “Pre-Announcement MPU” which 
is the average level of the news-based MPU index from 12 to 2 months before the 
acquisition announcement. 
 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables entering our cross-
sectional tests. Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of each of the variables. We 
report the mean and median levels for each of the variables, as well as their 25th and 75th 
percentiles. Moreover, we report the mean level for each variable during periods of high 
MPU and low MPU, as well as differentials between both means. We consider deals to be 
subject to high (low) MPU when the level of the variable “Announcement MPU” is higher 
(lower) than its median level in our sample. Similarly, given that the median annual 
change in FFR in our sample is zero, we consider deals announced at a time when this 
variable is higher (lower) than this median to be subject to monetary contraction 
(expansion). 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
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The results provide several key insights. First, acquirers in deals announced during 
periods of high MPU are smaller and have higher book-to-market valuation compared to 
acquirers of deals announced during periods of low MPU. Second, deals announced under 
high MPU are considerably smaller than deals announced under low MPU. Interestingly, 
equivalent differences in both acquirer and deal size are present between deals 
announced under monetary contraction versus monetary expansion. Moreover, in the 
spirit of Bonaime et al. (2018), this result supports the notion that acquirers with high 
market valuations, and hence more takeover opportunities, limit their involvement in the 
takeover market to relatively small deals during periods of high MPU. 
The descriptive statistics also suggest that acquirers differ between periods of 
monetary contraction and monetary expansion in terms of their cash and leverage ratios. 
More specifically, acquirers in periods of monetary contraction have lower indebtedness 
and higher cash ratios than acquirers in periods of monetary expansion. Additionally, 
acquirers under monetary expansion seem to experience noticeable relative declines in 
the level of net interest payment to total liabilities. This result provides some support to 
the view that monetary policy directly affects the acquirer’s cost of financing in the post-
acquisition period. 
In our multivariate tests later in the paper, we put more emphasis on the role of the 
acquirer’s pre-acquisition financial position in influencing various M&A outcomes. 
Moreover, the changes in deal- and firm-specific characteristics between periods of high 
and low MPU – and periods of monetary contraction and expansion – raise the 
requirement to apply a matching-based strategy to ensure that the differences in 





3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Univariate tests 
Table 3 presents results from our univariate tests on acquirer CAR. We group deals 
according to the change of FFR (contractionary as a positive change of FFR in the current 
quarter relative to the previous quarter vs. expansionary as a negative change of FFR 
during the same period) and the extent of MPU (low when the MPU is below the median 
level vs. high when the MPU is above the median level). For each of the days in the five-
day window (𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 + 2) surrounding the M&A announcement day (𝑡 = 0), we 
estimate the abnormal returns as: 
  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) (1) 
where: 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is the abnormal return to acquirer 𝑖 at day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the stock return of 
acquirer 𝑖, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the expected return of acquiring firm 𝑖 on the same day. The 
expected returns are estimated using the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model 
(3FF) as in Equation (2) below: 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = (1 − ?̂?𝑖)𝑅𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝐸(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + ?̂?𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑏𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + ?̂?𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) (2) 
The parameters ?̂?𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑏, and ?̂?𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑙  are estimated over days 𝑡 –  250 to 𝑡 –  20. 
 (𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
The announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖) for acquirer 𝑖 is 
estimated as the sum of the risk-adjusted returns over the five-day window (𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 +2) surrounding the M&A announcement day (𝑡 =  0), as outlined in Equation (4) below: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑡+2𝑡−2  (4) 
Panel A reports the effect of expansionary vs. contractionary monetary policy on the 
acquirer CAR. Acquirers in deals announced in the aftermath of monetary contractions 
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(i.e. an increase in FFR from the previous year) are associated with CAR that is 0.79% 
lower than the equivalent CAR in deals announced in the aftermath of monetary 
expansion (i.e. a decrease in FFR from the previous year). Unreported results show that 
this decline in acquirer CAR is driven by acquisitions of private (difference of -0.62%) and 
subsidiary target firms (difference of -1.81%) rather than by acquisitions of public target 
firms (difference of -0.15%). Previous research emphasizes the valuation difficulties 
associated with unlisted (private and subsidiary) target M&As due to the target firm’s 
opaque financial environment (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 
2001). This result provides initial support to the view that equity investors consider deals 
announced under monetary contraction to be poorly timed with significant valuation 
difficulties. Further multivariate analysis will examine how both acquirer CAR and 
various post-acquisition performance- and financing-related variables are influenced by the monetary policy’s stance.5 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Equally important evidence is presented in support of the “real options” channel. 
Panel B provides results from univariate tests of the acquirer CAR in periods of low vs. 
high MPU. Deals announced during a month where the MPU is higher (lower) than the 
median announcement period MPU in our sample are classified in the high (low) MPU 
group. Our results show that M&As announced during periods of high MPU reduce value 
creation in the short run. In particular, acquirers in deals announced during periods of 
high MPU experience 0.49% significantly lower CAR relative to deals announced during 
                                                             
5 Unreported results further show that the lower acquirer CAR from M&As announced during contractionary monetary 
policy periods, relative to expansionary ones, is driven by mixed-settled acquisitions (difference of -1.08%). We justify 
this based on results uncovering a strong association between monetary tightening and acquirer CAR, which is more 
pronounced in relatively large acquisitions. Equity investors are cautious in their assessment of relatively large deals, 
which are documented by Boone et al. (2014) to be highly likely to be settled in mixed payments during periods of 
monetary tightening. Overall, the “expected financing cost” channel is supported through our univariate tests, 
suggesting that M&As announced during periods of contractionary monetary policy tend to be value-destroying 
(significant at the 1% level), relative to M&As announced during periods of expansionary monetary policy. 
18 
 
periods of low MPU. In the following subsection, we refine this initial univariate evidence 
by examining how MPU influences the likelihood of deal withdrawal, the riskiness of the acquirer’s returns, and the post-acquisition shareholder value. 
 
3.2. Multivariate analysis 
3.2.1. The “expected financing cost” channel 
The key prediction of the “expected financing cost” channel is that a rise in the policy-
set interest rate predicts significant future financing challenges for the acquirer. These 
concerns manifest in a negative market reaction to the acquirer CAR upon the deal’s 
announcement. To assess the impact of the monetary policy’s direction on the acquirer’s 
CAR, we report eight models in Table 4. We include the FFR and the deviation of FFR from 
the natural rate as separate proxies for the direction of monetary policy. The models have 
different specifications and are estimated on samples of different sizes. Models (1) and 
(2) are baseline specifications in which we exclusively control for firm- and deal-specific 
factors in addition to industry effects. Model (3) controls for the effect of the overall 
market volatility, as in Bhagwat et al. (2016), and the overall uncertainty related to the 
economic activity, which is represented by the value of the U.S. leading index. The latter 
variable is estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia via a Vector 
Autoregression model that predicts the future values of the U.S. coincident indicators. The 
VAR model includes variables such as state-level housing permits (1 to 4 units), state 
initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply 
Management (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-
year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill. The sample in this model is limited to 
the post-1990 period to ensure the availability of the VIX index values. Model (4) is a 
more comprehensive specification as it includes variables reflecting the acquirer pre-
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acquisition performance, leverage, and cash ratios. Appendix 1 provides a detailed 
description of all variables. 
Models (1) to (4) in Table 4 show that the annual rise in FFR in the quarter preceding the acquisition’s announcement predicts a decline in acquirer CAR. Put simply, a one 
percentage point increase in FFR is, on average, associated with around a 0.15% decline 
in acquirer CAR. Similarly, a one percentage point increase in the deviation of FFR from 
its natural rate is, on average, associated with a 0.25% decline in acquirer CAR. Models 
(5) to (8) further show that the impact of FFR on acquirer CAR is more pronounced in 
M&As announced during periods of monetary contraction, rather than monetary 
expansion. Moreover, despite the deviation of FFR from its natural rate being significant 
in both periods, it is worth noting that the negative effect during monetary contraction is 
twice as large as its equivalent under monetary expansion.6 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
To support the proposition that the negative effect of FFR on acquirer CAR is 
driven by concerns about financing and liquidity challenges, we examine how the relation 
between FFR and CAR varies under different leverage and liquidity regimes. We expect 
the negative influence of monetary tightening on acquirer CAR to be more pronounced in 
M&As where the acquirer has a (a) high level of leverage, and (b) low cash ratio, before 
the acquisition. Evidence from Table 5 supports this prediction. More specifically, the 
effects of FFR and the deviations of FFR from the natural rate are statistically significant 
                                                             
6 An anonymous reviewer highlighted the importance of controlling for the impact of financial advisors in the deal. We 
re-estimate our models on the subsample of deals for which advisor information is available in SDC (4,832 
observations) and control for the presence of a top-tier advisor in the deal. The key additional independent variable is assigned the value of 1 if the acquirer’s advisors include any of the following companies: Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch 
(now Bank of America Merrill Lynch), Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citi/Salomon Smith Barney, Credit Suisse First 
Boston, Lehman Brothers (now Barclays Capital), and Lazard, and 0 otherwise. The advisors are labelled as Top-Tier 
by Golubov et al. (2012) based on their market share of takeover deals. We find that the presence of these advisors 
adds, on average, 1.30% additional acquirer CAR. More importantly, our results related to the effect of monetary policy 
on the acquirer CAR remain unchanged. 
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only for companies that are highly leveraged (in Models (1) and (2) compared to Models 
(3) and (4)). When we divide the deals according to the acquirer’s pre-acquisition cash 
ratios, we also find that the effects of FFR and its deviation from the natural rate on the 
acquirer CAR are statistically significant only for acquirers with low pre-acquisition cash 
ratios (Models (5) and (6) compared to Models (7) and (8)). It is also worth noting that 
our results are consistent if the top (bottom) 30% of deals are used to classify acquirers 
under high (low) debt and cash ratios.7 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
We provide further support to our proposition that the negative effect of FFR on 
acquirer CAR reflects the market’s view about the acquirer’s post-acquisition financing 
and liquidity challenges. We examine the effects of FFR (and its deviation from the natural 
rate) on a wide range of post-acquisition outcomes in Table 6. According to the “expected 
financing cost” channel, M&As announced under high levels of FFR should lead to a deterioration in the acquirer’s post-acquisition performance, a rise in stock riskiness, an 
increase in indebtedness, a reduction in cash reserves, and an increase in the cost of 
servicing debts. All these propositions are strongly supported in the models reported in 
Table 6. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
In particular, evidence from Models (1) and (2) (Panel A) suggests that a one 
percentage point increase in FFR or its deviation from the natural rate is, on average, 
associated with a 1.30% to 1.70% decline in the rate of change in the acquirer’s RoA in 
the year following the acquisition’s announcement. The evidence from Models (3) and (4) 
                                                             
7 The comments raised by an anonymous reviewer help us provide a complementary explanation for this result. In 
particular, hedging against interest rate movements is costly for acquirers that are highly leveraged and/or in weak liquidity positions. These constraints to hedging against interest rate risk intensify the market’s concerns about the deal’s prospects and are consequently reflected in lower announcement period acquirer CAR. 
21 
 
(Panel A), in turn, suggests that the rise in FFR and its deviation from the natural rate 
increase the difference in the level of acquirer indebtedness to total assets after the 
acquisition. To highlight the economic magnitude of this effect, it is worth noting that 
M&As announced during periods where FFR is at its 90th percentile in our sample are 
associated with a 4% increase in their debt ratios compared to deals in the 10th percentile 
of FFR. Unreported results also suggest that this effect is larger (6%) for deals in which the deal value is more than half of the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market valuation. 
Models (5) and (6) (Panel A) successfully highlight the significant negative impact of monetary contraction on the acquirer’s cash ratios. More precisely, the decline in the acquirer’s cash ratio in response to M&As announced during periods where FFR is at its 
90th percentile in our sample is 25% larger than the decline in the acquirer’s cash ratio 
for deals announced when FFR is at its 10th percentile. Models (7) and (8) (Panel A) 
further support the view that monetary tightening increases the acquirer’s cost of 
financing in the post-acquisition phase. Specifically, both FFR and its deviation from the 
natural rate are significant predictors of the increases in the difference between the value 
of net interest payments to total debt after the acquisition’s announcement compared to 
its level in the calendar year preceding the acquisition. Models (9) and (10) (Panel A) 
(Table 6) further highlight the contribution of monetary tightening to the increases in the 
level of risk that the acquirer faces in the post-acquisition period. 
Put together, the deterioration in accounting performance, rise in debt and its cost, 
deterioration in liquidity, and the increased level of risk testify to the highly consequential impact of the monetary policy’s direction on the outcomes in the market 
for corporate control. Given the considerable size of the M&A market and its 
consequential impact on employment, technological innovations, and financial markets, 
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our findings highlight an important monetary transmission channel that policymakers 
need to be cognizant of. 
Results reported in Panels B and C (Table 6) show that the deterioration in RoA and 
the increase in debt and stock riskiness can be avoided by acquirers who ensure an early 
cancellation of the deal. In particular, the negative impact of FFR on RoA and the positive 
effects of FFR on the change in the debt levels and stock riskiness become insignificant in 
cases when the deal is withdrawn within less than a quarter after its announcement 
(Panel B). In contrast, these effects are highly significant in cases when the deal is either 
completed or cancelled in later stages. 
The evidence reported in Table 7 reflects the impact of FFR and its deviation from 
the natural rate on a deal’s likelihood of withdrawal. In a nutshell, our results suggest that 
the challenges arising from a contractionary monetary policy incentivize acquirers to 
withdraw the deal. In particular, the rise in both FFR (Models (1) and (3)) and the 
deviation of FFR from the natural rate (Models (2) and (4)) significantly predict a higher 
likelihood of deal withdrawal. This predictive effect holds after controlling for a wide 
range of firm- and deal-related factors, in addition to the levels of overall economic and 
financial market uncertainties using the value of the Leading Index and the VIX, 
respectively. To the best of our knowledge, these results are the first to extend the 
literature on the determinants of deal withdrawal (Kau et al., 2008; Luo, 2005) by 
focusing on the critical role of monetary policy. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
3.2.2. The “real options” channel 
The “real options” channel predicts that acquirers engaging in M&As during periods 
of high MPU, and thus exercising the “wait and see” option, expose themselves to an 
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additional source of risk, at least in the short run. The evidence reported in Table 4 
(Models (1) to (4)) supports this key prediction: a one standard deviation increase in the 
news-based MPU index of Baker et al. (2016) at the time of the deal’s announcement is, 
on average, associated with a 0.40% decline in the acquirer CAR.8 As discussed in Section 
1, this evidence is quite distinct from the results reported in previous studies (Bonaime 
et al., 2018; Nguyen and Phan, 2017), mainly because the MPU index that we use is (a) 
news-based rather than driven by CPI and government spending projections, and (b) 
focused on the month of the deal’s announcement independently from the extended 
period of pre-acquisition due diligence. 
Interestingly, evidence from Models (5) to (8) (Table 4) suggests that the negative 
effect of MPU on acquirer CAR is particularly focused in periods of monetary expansion 
rather than monetary contraction. The exclusive presence of the MPU discount under 
monetary expansion, to a large extent, complements the results of Maggio and 
Kacperczyk (2017). Given that expansionary monetary policy incentivizes companies to 
invest in highly risky projects that are likely to cause significant losses if interest rates 
increase (Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017), equity investors seem to display high caution 
in reacting to M&As in an uncertain monetary environment in which interest rates might 
increase in the near future. 
The overall evidence from Tables 6 and 7 supports the general view that the 
challenges arising from MPU are relatively manageable by acquirers. In line with the risk-
based explanation, the evidence reported in Models (9) and (10) (Table 6) suggests that 
a rise in the announcement period MPU increases the average riskiness of the acquirer’s 
                                                             
8 An anonymous reviewer recommended further detailed examination of the direction in MPU rather than the level of the MPU index. Hence, in alternative estimations, we include the change in the MPU (∆MPU) as an independent variable. 
This variable is estimated as the difference between “Announcement MPU” and “Pre-Announcement MPU”. The effect 
of this variable on the acquirer CAR is found to be negative, statistically significant, and economically close to the negative effect of the “Announcement MPU” on the acquirer CAR. These results are available from the authors upon 
request. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
24 
 
shares in the period following the acquisition’s announcement compared to the level of 
pre-acquisition risk. When it comes to the influence of MPU on the likelihood of deal 
withdrawal, Table 7 provides initial evidence (Models (1) and (2)) suggesting that the 
rise in MPU predicts an increase in the likelihood of deal withdrawal. However, this effect 
fades after controlling for the levels of financial market uncertainty using the VIX index 
and the level of overall economic uncertainty (Models (3) and (4)). 
 
3.2.3. Propensity score matching and buy-and-hold returns 
We apply the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, 1984; Smith and Todd, 2005) to examine whether our 
results related to the wealth effects of the monetary policy’s stance are driven by 
observable characteristics. In the spirit of Alexandridis et al. (2017), we use the 
propensity scores estimated via a Logit model to produce close matches of deals 
announced under monetary contraction to deals announced under monetary expansion.9 
On the matched sample, we estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). 
In Table 8, we present the results of our PSM analysis. The dependent variable in our 
Logit model (Panel A) is assigned the value of one if FFR increased on a yearly basis in the 
quarter preceding the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise. We use the 
propensity score estimates from the Logit model to match treated observations (deals 
under monetary contraction) to control ones using a caliper of 0.001. In line with Dehejia 
and Wahba (2002), we allow each control observation to be used more than once. 
The ATT estimated from Panel B (Table 8) is negative (-0.50%) and significant at the 
5% level. Acquirers announcing deals under monetary contraction realize, on average, 
                                                             
9 It is essential to note that, in the context of this investigation, PSM is not used as a treatment predictor but rather as a 




0.50% lower announcement period CAR than acquirers announcing their deals under 
monetary expansion. This treatment effect is relatively close to the effect reported earlier 
in our univariate analysis in Table 3 (Panel A). 
We also assess the effect of monetary contraction on the acquirer’s post-acquisition 
shareholder gains. For each matched pair of deals, we estimate the Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHAR) as the difference between the acquirer’s cumulative shareholder gains under 
monetary contraction compared to the gains in a matched deal under monetary 
expansion during the 12-month period following the deal’s announcement, as described 
in Equation (5): 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛= ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑡)𝑡=12𝑡=1 − ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑡)𝑡=12𝑡=1  (5) 
The evidence presented in Panel B (Table 8) suggests the deals announced under 
monetary contraction experience a significant negative post-acquisition drift in returns 
compared to deals announced under monetary expansion. In particular, acquirers 
involved in deals in the former group realize, on average, 4% lower post-acquisition 
returns than acquirers in the latter group. These findings highlight the significant 
challenges that acquirers face under monetary contraction as they fail to provide gains to 
their shareholders as a compensation for the increased riskiness in the business 
environment. 
Panel C (Table 8) highlights the success of the matching exercise in balancing both 
the propensity score estimates and the key observable variables between the treated and 
the control groups. More specifically, none of the differences between the observable 
covariates in the treated and control groups is statistically significant at the 10% level on 
the matched sample. 
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(Insert Table 8 about here) 
In Table 9, we re-apply our PSM analysis to the comparison between the acquirer 
CAR in deals announced under high and low MPU. The dependent variable in the Logit 
model of Panel A is assigned the value of one if the variable “Announcement MPU” 
exceeds its median level in our sample, and zero otherwise. The results of the matching 
analysis (Panel B) are also consistent with our univariate analysis of the acquirer CAR: 
acquirers announcing deals under high MPU realize, on average, 0.81% less acquirer CAR 
than acquirers announcing their deals under low MPU.10 
(Insert Table 9 about here) For the acquirer’s post-acquisition gains, our matching-based findings suggest that 
acquirers under high MPU experience a positive drift in their returns compared to 
acquirers under low MPU. In the 12-month period that follows the acquisition’s 
announcement, acquirers under high MPU manage to realize 3% higher cumulative gains 
relative to acquirers in comparable deals under low MPU. This result supports the view that equity investors’ concerns about the timing of the M&A under the “real options” 
channel are short term phenomena (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001). During the post-
acquisition period, acquirers seem to be able to deliver significant gains to their 
shareholders.11 
Overall, our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between the direction 
of monetary policy on the one hand, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding this 
                                                             
10 Panel C (Table 9) also highlights the success of matching in balancing the key observable covariates. Put together, 
the evidence from Tables 8 and 9 shows that our results are not influenced by observable differences in firm- or deal-
related characteristics. 
11 We further examine how the positive effect of the announcement period MPU on the acquirer’s post-acquisition BHAR varies with the acquirer’s size. In untabulated results, we find that this positive effect is stronger in the acquisitions announced by small acquirers. This positive effect gradually declines as the acquirer’s size increases. To a 
large extent, these results are aligned with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) suggesting that acquisitions announced 
by small companies are not hubris-driven and hence are better designed to increase the acquirer’s shareholder value. 
In the context of our study, this result implies that, once the temporary uncertainty associated with monetary policy is 
resolved, M&As designed by small acquirers are better suited to increase shareholder wealth compared to M&As 
designed by larger acquirers. 
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policy, on the other. While a contractionary monetary policy has a negative impact on the acquirer’s shareholder returns in both the short and medium terms, MPU tends to have a temporary negative effect on the acquirer’s shareholder wealth only in the short term. 
 
3.2.4. Is the effect of MPU unique? 
Our emphasis at the beginning of Section 1 is on the uniqueness of the challenges 
posed by MPU. We attribute this uniqueness to the far-reaching impact of monetary 
policy decisions on both the economy and financial markets (Maggio and Kacperczyk, 
2017). We also emphasize the limited constraints that monetary policy decision-makers 
face (Taylor, 2000). This makes monetary policy decisions, and the uncertainty 
associated with such decisions, highly consequential for (a) companies considering new 
investments and (b) equity investors assessing the economic prospects of such 
investments. In this section, we provide an empirical examination of our proposition on 
the uniqueness of monetary policy challenges. In particular, we examine whether other 
news-based uncertainties related to the subcategories discussed by Baker et al. (2016) 
affect various M&A outcomes in similar ways to those of MPU. 
In Table 10 (Panel A), we re-report the previously estimated coefficient of MPU on 
the acquirer CAR. We also estimate the effects of ten policy uncertainty indices on the 
same M&A outcome. These news-based policy uncertainty indices are related to general 
fiscal policy (taxes or spending), taxes, spending, healthcare, national security, 
entitlement programs, regulation, financial regulation, trade policy, and finally sovereign 
debt/currency crises. Each of these indices is based on the frequency of mentions of 
policy-specific terms in the Access World News database. For instance, the index 
associated with trade policy uncertainty is positively correlated with mentions of terms 
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like “import tariffs,” “import duty,” “import barrier,” “government subsidies,” “government subsidy,” and “wto,” among others. 
The coefficients reported in Panel A (Table 10) suggest that, after controlling for the 
effect of MPU, none of the alternative news-based policy uncertainty indices has an effect 
on the acquirer CAR that is equivalent to the effect of MPU. General fiscal policy 
uncertainty and the specific uncertainties related to taxes, spending, national security, 
regulations, and financial regulations are not associated with significant declines in the 
acquirer CAR. Moreover, contrary to the case of MPU, equity investors do not require 
significant discounts when facing uncertainties related to healthcare and entitlement. 
These investors rather put their trust in the acquirers’ ability to navigate such challenges, 
which leads to a rise in the announcement period CAR. This result supports Nguyen and 
Phan’s (2017) conjecture that a rise in policy uncertainty incentivizes acquirers to be 
highly prudent in the design of their acquisitions. 
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
The only exception reported in Panel A is the case of the uncertainty associated with 
sovereign debt and currency crises. Specifically, equity investors seem to require a 
discount in response to a rise in such uncertainty. Two aspects of these effects are worth 
noting. First, the magnitude of the uncertainty discount in the case of sovereign debt and 
currency crises is considerably smaller than the case of MPU. The coefficient associated 
with the former uncertainty category (-0.0009) is considerably smaller than the 
coefficient associated with MPU (-0.006). Second, concerns about sovereign debt and 
currency crises are not necessarily independent from the actions of monetary authorities. 
Hence, a reasonable explanation for the small uncertainty discount associated with 
sovereign debt and currency crises is that this negative market reaction is, to some extent, an extension of equity investors’ concerns about monetary uncertainty on a global scale. 
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In Panel B (Table 10) we expand our multivariate analysis by including the first 
principal component of the remaining policy categories (PC1 Others) as an additional 
regressor in examining the variation in the acquirer CAR. The construction of this 
principal component is described in Appendix 1. After controlling for the significant 
negative effect of MPU, the general inference from the four reported models is that 
neither PC1 Others not its interactions with MPU have any significant influence on the acquirer’s announcement period CAR. Put together, these results support our main 
conjecture that the effect of MPU on the acquirer CAR is not necessarily moderated by 
uncertainties associated with other policy categories. 
 
3.2.5. Calendar year fixed effects 
The next step in our cross-sectional tests aims to examine whether the wealth effects 
associated with the variables referring to the stance of the monetary policy are conflated 
by calendar year fixed effects. We address this issue in Table 11, where we present two 
models that combine monetary policy variables and calendar year fixed effects. To 
examine the additional effects associated with monetary policy variables, we run a Wald 
test. In each model we impose the restriction that all the coefficients associated with the 
variables related to the stance of the monetary policy are jointly equal to zero. This 
restriction is decisively rejected in the two reported models. We also impose the 
restriction that all the calendar year fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. Interestingly, 
this restriction is not easily rejected. The corresponding p-values in Models (1) and (2) 
are 0.08 and 0.11, respectively. Overall, our results show that the stance of the monetary 
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policy at the time of the deal’s announcement are highly relevant, and their effects are not 
captured by simple calendar year controls.12 
(Insert Table 11 about here) 
 
3.2.6. The effect of monetary policy on the premium and contractual provisions 
We extend our analysis by examining how monetary policy influences the variation 
in both the premium paid and the choice of contractual tools. With regards to the 
premium, Bonaime et al. (2018) find that high general policy uncertainty increases the 
bargaining power of the target firms and allows them to extract high takeover premia. 
The evidence that we report in Table 12 (Models (1) and (2)) shows that MPU has a 
qualitatively similar influence on the takeover premium. In particular, the rise in MPU, 
both in the period covering due diligence (i.e., “Pre-Announcement MPU”) and the period 
covering the announcement (i.e., “Announcement MPU”), predicts a rise in the takeover 
premium. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the “Pre-Announcement 
MPU” predicts a 6% rise in the takeover premium. Moreover, the short term rise in MPU at the time of the deal’s settlement also predicts a rise in the premium, yet a smaller one. 
A one standard deviation rise in MPU at the time of the deal’s announcement predicts a 
1% increase in the takeover premium. 
An established array of studies investigates the use of the target termination fee 
provision in the acquisition deal (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Chapple et al., 2007; Coates, 
2009; Coates and Subramanian, 2000; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Officer, 2003). This 
provision requires a target deciding not to proceed with the deal to pay a pre-specified 
sum (a fee) to the acquirer (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). In the realm of M&A, Bonaime et 
                                                             




al. (2018) report that a rise in general policy uncertainty reduces the likelihood of using 
termination fee provisions. They interpret their result as evidence that high policy 
uncertainty increases the bargaining power of target firms and limits their requirement 
to commit to a deal. Our MPU-based results support this interpretation: Logit Models (3) 
and (4) show that the rise in the MPU during the due diligence phase reduces the 
likelihood of the presence of termination fee provision in the deal. 
Models (5) and (6) (Table 12) extend our analysis to study whether the choice of 
deferred (earnout) payments by merging firms is affected by the monetary policy’s 
stance. By including an earnout provision in the deal, the acquirer defers a part of the deal 
payment and links its settlement to the target firm meeting certain pre-determined 
performance-based goals (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000; 
Reuer et al., 2004). Earnout provisions are usually used by financially constrained 
acquirers trying to overcome the valuation and information asymmetry challenges in 
their deals (Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000). 
Accordingly, earnouts might be an effective tool for acquirers in a contractionary 
monetary environment. However, a contractionary monetary policy can tighten the acquirer’s financing constraints and might limit their ability to commit to deferred 
payments. Hence, target firms can reject the deferral of a significant part of the payment, 
and might prefer that their deal payment be fully settled at the time of the deal’s 
announcement. Our results are consistent with this interpretation. Specifically, a rise in 
both FFR (Model 5) and the deviation of FFR from the natural rate (Model 6) significantly 
reduce the likelihood of using deferred payments. These findings enhance the rich body 
of literature that focuses on the determinants of the inclusion of earnout provisions. 
While this literature mainly focuses on the role of firm- and deal-specific factors in 
predicting the use of earnouts (Barbopoulos et al., 2012, 2018; Barbopoulos and Adra, 
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2016; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009), our results 
add a new dimension by emphasizing the critical role of the monetary environment as a 
key predictor of earnout inclusion in M&As.13 
(Insert Table 12 about here) 
 
4. Time Series Analysis of Monetary Policy Effects on M&As 
In this section, we extend our analysis to examine the time variation in the aggregate 
M&A activity. In particular, we examine whether the two monetary-policy-related 
channels that significantly influence the riskiness and wealth effects of M&A (discussed 
in Section 3) also affect the variation in the aggregate M&A activity over time. We assess 
the effect of MPU on the aggregate M&A activity in the context of the “real options” 
channel via which highly irreversible investments are equivalent to financial call options 
that can be either exercised or delayed at any point in time (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Kellog, 2014). Accordingly, we test whether the rise in MPU is significant to the point 
where the option to “wait and see” becomes highly valuable to deter companies from 
engaging in M&As. Furthermore, building on our robust cross-sectional evidence 
highlighting the negative effect of monetary contraction on the acquirer gains in both the 
short and long run, we test in a time series context whether monetary contraction is a key 
contributor to the decline in the M&A activity. 
                                                             
13
 An anonymous reviewer recommended that we examine the impact of monetary policy on the structure of Material 
Adverse Change (MAC) clauses. A MAC clause provides explicit conditions under which the acquirer can walk away 
from the deal (Denis and Macias, 2013). We thank Professor David Denis and Professor Antonio Macias who agreed to 
share with us their dataset that covers deals with MAC clauses between 1998 and 2005. Our analysis shows that monetary tightening reduces the number of MAC clauses. As MAC clauses make the acquirer’s otherwise easy 
abandonment option void under specified circumstances (Bonaime et al., 2018), a tight monetary policy might raise 
the acquirer’s concerns about future financing challenges and hence limits its commitment to the inclusion of MAC 
clauses. We also find that MPU during the pre-announcement period reduces the number of signed MAC clauses in the 
deal. Potentially, the concerns about future financing challenges when negotiating a deal incentivizes acquirers, who 
have already agreed to pay significantly high premia, to limit their commitment to MAC clauses. 
33 
 
Our time series analysis is based on a comprehensive sample covering the quarterly 
levels of M&As in addition to a wide range of economic variables over the period between 
1986 and 2017. We present the level of M&A activity as the natural logarithm of the 
quarterly dollar sum of domestic M&As that satisfy the criteria presented in Section 2. 
Furthermore, in addition to controlling for the level of general economic policy 
uncertainty using the Baker et al. (2016) news-based index, our VAR model includes the 
quarterly level monetary policy news-based index. This variable is assigned the value of 
the BBD news-based index that is reported for the second month of each quarter. To 
assess the impact of monetary contraction/expansion on the aggregate M&A activity, our 
analysis also includes the quarterly level of FFR. As a proxy for general economic 
expectations, we use the leading index that is reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Following Bonaime et al. (2018), we include Robert Shiller’s Cyclically Adjusted 
Price-Earnings ratio (first difference) in our estimations. Finally, we control for the effect 
of aggregate economic conditions via the quarterly level of GDP growth. The variables 
used in estimating the VAR model are fully defined in Appendix 2. 
We estimate a VAR model that combines the variables mentioned above with a one-
quarter lag. In Table 13, we report the VAR model equation that explains the variation in 
the aggregate M&A activity. First, in line with Bonaime et al.’s (2018) results that are 
based on monthly data, we find that general policy uncertainty is a significant predictor 
of the decline in the M&A activity. However, our results show that the level of MPU does 
not influence the M&A activity. Kang et al. (2014) report a qualitatively similar result in 
their analysis of the impact of MPU on aggregate corporate investment activity. One 
explanation that they provide for their result is that MPU, and the risks associated with 
it, tend to be perceived by corporate managers as temporary, hence not requiring them 
to delay or cancel large investments. Along similar lines, it seems that potential acquirers 
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are not deterred by the high riskiness associated with MPU when engaging in takeovers. 
To a large extent, these results are aligned with our cross-sectional evidence from Section 
4, whereby acquirers manage to overcome the riskiness associated with MPU to deliver 
significant post-acquisition gains to their shareholders. 
(Insert Table 13 about here) 
Second, we find that the rise in FFR is a significant predictor of the decline in M&A 
activity. The impulse response results presented in Figure 3 support this view by 
depicting how one Cholesky standard deviation shock in the FFR significantly reduces 
M&A activity. This aggregate activity takes up to five quarters before starting to recover 
from the downturn driven by monetary contraction. 
Our findings establish a new link between monetary policy and the market for 
corporate control. In particular, the insignificant impact of MPU on M&A levels does not 
imply that monetary policy should not be considered an influential factor in the analysis 
of the variation in M&As. On the contrary, monetary contraction – through its influence 
on the financing conditions discussed in Section 3 – has a significant and far-reaching 
negative influence on aggregate M&A value. 
Two non-mutually exclusive explanations can be provided for this result. First, 
monetary contraction tightens the financing constraints of companies (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Jiménez et al., 2012; Kashyap et al., 1993) and 
leads them to reassess the feasibility of expansionary investments such as M&As. Second, 
monetary contraction predicts future declines in aggregate output (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992; Romer and Romer, 1989), which reduces the value creation prospects of 
potential acquisitions and hence limits engagement in M&As. 





We provide a direct empirical examination of the relationship between monetary 
policy and the outcomes associated with Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). Such 
outcomes include the acquirer gains within a small window surrounding the M&A’s 
announcement date, M&A completion rates, and post-acquisition variation in the 
acquirer’s debt, liquidity, and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). Our results 
suggest that monetary policy influences M&A outcomes via two distinctive channels. 
First, via the “expected financing cost” channel, we show that deals announced during 
periods of monetary contraction tend to reduce acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns. We 
show that this reduction in acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns reflects the market’s 
concerns about the leverage and liquidity positions in the aftermath of the acquisition. 
Second, we show that, in the context of the “real options” view of investments, equity 
investors require a significant discount for holding the shares of companies that engage 
in acquisitions during periods of high monetary policy uncertainty (MPU). This discount 
reflects the high riskiness that acquirers face in an uncertain monetary environment: 
such deals increase the variation in acquirers’ post-acquisition returns. Nevertheless, we 
show that acquirers, on average, manage to overcome the short term challenges 
associated with high MPU and eventually manage to realize significant post-acquisition 
gains. 
Our time series evidence emphasizes the relevant role of monetary policy in 
predicting aggregate M&A activity. Our results show that the federal funds rate, rather 
than monetary policy uncertainty, is the main monetary-policy-related factor influencing 
the variation in M&As. Evidence from our impulse response analysis suggests that 
monetary tightening drives a significant reduction in M&A activity for up to five quarters. 
36 
 
Overall, our emphasis on the distinctive impact of monetary policy on a wide range 
of M&A outcomes provides a novel link between the monetary policy literature and the 
field of M&A. Further investigation is required to examine the influence of monetary 




Appendix 1 Variables definitions 
 
Variable Definition Source 
CAR (%) 
The acquirer’s 5-day (-2, 2) announcement period cumulative abnormal returns. The abnormal return in each day is the difference between the acquiring firm’s actual returns and the acquiring firm’s expected returns estimated using the 3-factor FF (1996) model. 
CRSP & Kenneth French Webpage & Authors’ Estimations 
Announcement MPU 
The value of the news-based monetary policy uncertainty index at the time of the deal’s announcement. If the deal is announced before (after) the 15th day of the month, the value of the news-based monetary policy index in the previous (same) calendar month is assigned to this variable. 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
Acquirer Market Value 
The acquirer’s market value 43 days before the acquisition’s announcement. Compustat 
Acquirer RoA 
The acquirer’s return on assets in the calendar year preceding the acquisition’s announcement. Compustat 
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) 
The level of the federal funds rate in the quarter preceding the acquisition’s announcement. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
Deviation of FFR from 
Natural Rate 
The difference between the federal funds rate and the natural interest rate estimated using the Laubach and Williams (2003) method in the quarter preceding the acquisition’s announcement. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Acquirer Book-to-Market 
The acquirer’s book-to-market value 43 days before the acquisition’s announcement. Compustat 
Deal Value The total dollar value of the deal. SDC 
Relative Deal Size 
The total deal value divided by the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market valuation. SDC 
Stock Percentage 
The percentage of the deal payment that is settled in stock. SDC 
 Acquirer Toehold 
The percentage of the target shares held by the acquirer six months before the acquisition. SDC 
PC1 Other 
The first principal component of the uncertainties associated with alternative policy subcategories. This principal component has the following loading on the policy subcategories: 0.46 (Fiscal Policy), 0.43 (Healthcare), 0.29 (National Security), 0.42 (Entitlement), 0.35 (Regulation), 0.44 (Financial regulation), 0.08 (trade), and 0.08 (Sovereign Debt), 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ & Authors’ Estimations 
Pre-Announcement MPU 
The average monthly level of the news-based monetary policy uncertainty index between the twelfth and the second month preceding the acquisition’s announcement (inclusive). http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
Acquirer Cash 
The acquirer’s cash ratio in the calendar year preceding the acquisition.  Compustat 
Acquirer Debt 
The acquirer’s debt ratio in the calendar year preceding the acquisition. Compustat 
VIX 







Continued (Appendix 1 Variables definitions) 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Leading Index 
The monthly value of the leading index for the U.S. economy at the time of the deal’s announcement. This index is the composite of the predicted levels of coincident economic indicators for each state using a VAR model that includes variables related to housing, interest rates, manufacturing, and unemployment. The assignment of the Leading Index values to the month of the deal announcement follows the same rule that is used in constructing the variable “Announcement MPU”. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database 
Private 
Dummy=1 if the target is a private firm, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Public 
Dummy=1 if the target is a public firm, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Subsidiary 
Dummy=1 if the target is a subsidiary firm, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Withdrawn 
Dummy=1 if the deal is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Full Cash 
Dummy=1 if the deal payment is fully settled in cash, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Full Stock 
Dummy=1 if the deal payment is fully settled in stock, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Mixed/Other 
Dummy=1 if the deal payment is settled using a mix of cash and stock (or any alternative payment method), and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Premium 
The difference between the deal value and the target’s market value, divided by the latter variable and multiplied by 100. SDC 
Diversified 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise [Focused]. SDC 
∆ Acquirer Sigma The difference between the standard deviation of the errors from the FF 3-factor regression using the acquirer’s daily returns in the year following the acquisition and its equivalent level in the year preceding the announcement. Compustat 
∆ Acquirer Cash The difference between the acquirer’s cash ratio in the year that follows the acquisition and the corresponding level in the year preceding the acquisition. Compustat 
∆ Acquirer Debt The difference between the acquirer’s debt ratio in the year that follows the acquisition and the corresponding level in the year preceding the acquisition. Compustat 
∆ Acquirer Interest-to-
Debt 
The difference between the value of net interest payment as a percentage to total liabilities in the year following the announcement from the equivalent level in the year preceding the announcement. Compustat 
∆ Acquirer RoA The difference between the acquirer’s return on assets (RoA) in the year that follows the acquisition and the corresponding level in the year preceding the acquisition. Compustat 
Target Termination Fee 
Dummy=1 if the deal includes a target termination fee agreement, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Earnout 





Appendix 2 Time series variables 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Q_FFR The quarterly level of the federal funds rate. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database 
Q_MPU 
The level of news-based monetary policy uncertainty index at the end of each quarter. http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
Q_Leading Index 
An index estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia via a Vector Autoregression model that predicts the future values of the U.S. coincident indicators. The VAR model includes variables such as state-level housing permits (1 to 4 units), state initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database 
GDP Growth 
The quarterly growth in real Gross Domestic Product. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database 
∆CAPE The difference in the level of the Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings ratio between the month at the end of each quarter and the corresponding level of this ratio in the previous quarter. Professor Robert Shiller’s website 
Policy Uncertainty 
The level of the aggregated BBD policy uncertainty index at the end of each quarter. http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
M&A Value 
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Table 1 Annual distribution of the sample 
 




1986 174 77 65 32 39 60 64 50 59 
1987 197 85 77 35 41 63 77 57 74 
1988 179 95 42 42 42 82 44 53 69 
1989 281 98 104 79 66 92 109 80 111 
1990 215 63 85 67 44 67 72 76 92 
1991 247 62 117 68 35 49 95 103 91 
1992 396 84 213 99 55 84 162 150 145 
1993 533 109 285 139 57 131 203 199 204 
1994 684 154 376 154 76 170 235 279 266 
1995 714 177 366 171 79 181 270 263 260 
1996 726 144 420 162 77 170 295 261 295 
1997 922 207 495 220 102 214 348 360 361 
1998 832 201 469 162 100 188 296 348 323 
1999 664 170 374 120 67 149 258 257 249 
2000 518 115 318 85 72 96 224 198 190 
2001 278 85 124 69 30 76 92 110 113 
2002 236 39 127 70 23 88 38 110 81 
2003 189 49 91 49 14 52 38 99 63 
2004 265 62 141 62 19 123 39 103 76 
2005 373 65 204 104 27 176 35 162 126 
2006 390 66 214 110 31 203 24 163 163 
2007 403 89 222 92 55 188 36 179 139 
2008 319 58 175 86 55 158 25 136 116 
2009 213 57 97 59 27 101 33 79 67 
2010 247 54 117 76 25 149 15 83 82 
2011 246 46 133 67 20 123 19 104 82 
2012 270 57 133 80 17 139 23 108 87 
2013 238 49 116 73 51 125 25 88 62 
2014 368 76 210 82 31 160 46 162 101 
2015 378 89 186 103 34 104 31 243 135 
2016 296 73 126 97 79 75 22 199 108 
2017 359 64 187 108 47 75 31 253 129 
N 12,350 2,919 6,409 3,022 1,537 3,911 3,324 5,115 4,519 
% 100 23.64 51.89 24.47 12.45 31.67 26.91 41.42 36.59 
 
The table presents the annual distribution of our sample of domestic M&As announced by U.S. public acquirers between 
1 January 1986 and 31 December 2017. The targets covered in the sample are public, private, and subsidiary firms. The 
annual distribution of the sample, which depicts the sum of the annual M&A activity, is presented according to the target firm’s listing status, the deal’s completion profile (withdrawn/completed), the payment method used (full cash, 



































Acquirer Market Value 12,350 3,406.20 325.81 80.01 1,273.24 2,650.62 4,201.47 -1,550.85*** 2,673.08 4,132.95 -1,459.87*** 
Acquirer Book-to-Market 9,561 0.49 0.40 0.23 0.65 0.56 0.46 0.10*** 0.52 0.47 0.05*** 
Deal Value 12,350 415.46 31.00 9.75 124.89 296.87 540.30 -243.43*** 356.85 473.58 -107.73* 
Relative Deal Size 12,350 0.45 0.12 0.04 0.34 0.45 0.46 -0.01 0.46 0.44 0.02 
Stock Percentage 12,350 38.86 6.67 0.00 100.00 39.32 38.39 0.93 41.06 36.69 4.37*** 
 Acquirer Toehold 12,350 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.02* 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Pre-Announcement MPU 12,350 86.81 82.33 66.57 106.48 93.04 80.26 12.78*** 98.61 75.11 23.50*** 
Acquirer Cash 10,941 13.57 6.44 2.22 18.20 13.67 13.46 0.21 14.16 12.99 1.17*** 
Acquirer Debt 11,197 53.59 52.67 30.41 74.53 53.31 53.88 -0.57 52.66 54.50 -1.84*** 
VIX 11,519 18.89 17.19 13.37 23.26 20.44 17.32 3.12*** 20.73 17.01 -3.72*** 
Leading Index 12,350 1.39 1.56 1.15 1.81 1.25 1.52 -0.27*** 1.27 1.50 -1.23*** 
Acquirer RoA 9,659 -3.46 3.33 -2.13 7.33 -4.03 -2.85 -1.18* -3.99 -2.97 -1.02 
Premium 2,361 49.95 37.00 20.00 62.00 53.89 45.99 7.9*** 53.40 46.50 6.9*** ∆ Acquirer Interest-to-Debt 6,634 -0.19 -0.01 -0.92 0.95 -0.24 0.14 0.10 -0.37 -0.04 -0.33*** ∆ Acquirer Debt 9,771 6.57 1.66 -2.53 12.01 6.39 6.76 -0.37 5.73 7.33 -1.60** ∆ Acquirer Cash 9,517 -3.98 -0.63 -25.48 4.72 -3.79 -4.18 1.01 -4.43 -3.58 -0.85*** ∆ Acquirer RoA 8,370 -9.13 -1.35 -5.19 0.94 -9.41 -8.82 -0.59 -5.70 -12.25 6.55** ∆ Acquirer Sigma 12,242 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.30 0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.03 0.14 0.11*** 
 
The table presents the key descriptive statistics of the empirical variables used in the analysis. For each variable, we report the number of available observations, the mean, 
and the median in addition to the 25th and 75th percentiles. Additionally, we report the mean level of each variable under high and low monetary policy uncertainty (MPU), 
in addition to the difference between these two levels and its significance. Deals are classified in the high (low) MPU group if the value of the “Announcement MPU” variable 
is above (below) the median level in our sample. We follow the same approach in analyzing the means of the deals announced under monetary expansion and monetary 
contraction. The classification of deals into groups defined by monetary expansion and contraction is based on the level of the annual change in the level of the federal funds rate in the quarter preceding the deal’s announcement. The median level of this change in our sample is 0, which allows us to split the sample into two equal groups 
of deals under monetary expansion and deals under monetary contraction. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to 




Table 3 Univariate analysis of acquirer CAR under different monetary regimes 
 
Panel A: Monetary policy stance 
Statistic\Group 
All Deals Contraction Expansion 
Contraction minus 
Expansion 
Mean 2.23*** 1.84*** 2.63*** -0.79*** 
N 12,350 6,175 6,175  
Panel B: Announcement MPU 
Statistic\Group All Deals High  Low  High minus Low 
Mean 2.23*** 1.99*** 2.48*** -0.49** 
N 12,350 6,175 6,175  
 
The table presents the univariate analysis of the acquirer’s CAR under monetary contraction and expansion (Panel A) and 
under high and low monetary policy uncertainty (Panel B). In Panel A, we report the average acquirer CAR in the overall 
sample, the average level under monetary contraction, and its equivalent under monetary expansion, in addition to the 
difference between these two levels and its level of significance. We also report the number of observations in each group. 
We follow a similar approach in Panel B, where we report the average acquirer CAR in the overall sample, the average level 
under high monetary policy uncertainty, and its equivalent under low monetary policy uncertainty, in addition to the 
difference between these two levels and its level of significance. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 




Table 4 Multivariate analysis on acquirer CAR 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 









Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variable CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 












Deviation of FFR from Natural Rate 
 -0.205*** 
(0.068) 



















































































































































































    
Leading Index 




    
Acquirer Book-To-Market 
   -0.672 
(0.649) 
    
Acquirer Cash 
   -0.003 
(0.014) 
    
Acquirer Debt 
   -0.006 
(0.008) 
    
Acquirer RoA 
   -0.017* 
(0.009) 


















Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 12.350 12.350 11,506 7,934 6,175 6,175 6,175 6,175 









The table presents eight models explaining the variation in the acquirer’s announcement period CAR. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the initial sample. Model (3) controls for the effects of the leading index and the level of the VIX at the time of the deal’s announcement on the subsample starting from the year 1990, the first year for 
which the VIX data is publicly available. Model (4) expands the analysis to cover acquirer-specific pre-acquisition financial variables. Models (5) and (6) are estimated on 
the sample of deals announced in the aftermath of monetary contraction, i.e. annual rise in the federal funds rate (FFR). Models (7) to (8) are estimated on the sample of 
deals announced in the aftermath of monetary expansion. White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 




Table 5 The monetary policy effect on CAR under different debt and liquidity regimes 
 
 
The table presents eight models explaining the variation in the acquirer’s CAR under different leverage and liquidity regimes. The control variables are the same as those 
used in Model (3) in Table 4. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer’s debt ratio exceeds the median level in the sample. Models (3) and (4) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer’s debt ratio is below the median level in the sample. Models (5) and (6) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer’s cash ratio exceeds the median level in the sample. Models (7) and (8) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer’s cash ratio 
is below the median level in the sample. For each pair of models, the level of the federal funds rate (FFR) in the quarter preceding the announcement is used as proxy for 
the stance of monetary policy in the first model. The difference between FFR and the corresponding natural rate of interest estimated using the Laubach and Williams 
(2003) method is used in the second model. White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

























Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variable CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
























































Control Factors YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 5,282 5,282 5,282 5,282 4,990 4,990 4,990 4,990 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
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∆ Acquirer  
RoA 






∆ Acquirer  
Cash 
∆ Acquirer  
Cash 
∆ Acquirer  
Interest-to-
Debt 







Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: All Deals 


































































Control Factors YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 8,370 8,370 9,771 9,771 9,517 9,517 6,634 6,634 12,342 12,342 
R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.32 0.32 
Panel B: Deals with Early Withdrawal 


































































Control Factors YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 305 305 342 342 337 337 225 225 476 476 
R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.41 0.41 0.56 0.55 0.69 0.69 
Panel C: Completed Deals/Deals with Late Withdrawal 


































































Control Factors YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 8,065 8,065 9,429 9,429 9,180 9,180 6,409 6,409 11,866 11,866 
R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.23 0.23 
 
The table presents ten models which represent the variation in five post-acquisition outcomes. Models (1) and (2) explain the variation in the change in the acquirer’s 
Return on Assets (RoA) between the year that follows the acquisition and the year that precedes it. Models (3) and (4) explain the variation in the acquirer’s debt ratio over the same period. Models (5) and (6) apply an equivalent analysis to the change in the acquirer’s cash ratio. Models (7) and (8) analyze the difference in the percentage 
of the acquirer’s net interest payments relative to total debt. Models (9) and (10) analyze the difference in the sigma of the acquirer’s daily returns before and after the acquisition’s announcement. The control variables in each model are the same as those reported in Table 6. Moreover, in each model, we include the lagged level of the 
independent variable as an additional regressor. Panel A reports the analysis for the overall sample. Panel B limits the analysis to the deals that are withdrawn within one 
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quarter of the announcement. Panel C applies the analysis to completed deals and the deals that are cancelled after one quarter of the announcement. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 7 The likelihood of deal withdrawal 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 

































































































































Industry Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 12,350 12,350 11,506 11,506 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
 
The table presents four Logit models predicting the likelihood of deal withdrawal. The dependent variable (Withdrawn) is 
assigned the value of 1 if the deal is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise. In Models (1) and (3), the stance of monetary policy is 
presented by the level of the federal funds rate in the quarter preceding the announcement. In Models (2) and (4), this 
stance is presented by the difference between the federal funds rate and the Laubach and Williams (2003) natural rate of 
interest. Models (3) and (4) control for two additional factors: the VIX index and the Leading Economic index for the United 
States. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an 
accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 8 PSM analysis under monetary policy stance (contraction vs. expansion) 
 
Panel A: Logit model 





























Panel B: Matching Results for CAR 
Matching Algorithm Caliper=0.001 with replacement 
Matched Observations per Treated Deal 1:1 
Number of Treated Observations 5,529 
Number of Control Observations  5,529 
CAR 𝐴𝑇𝑇 (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) -0.50** (0.25) 
BHAR 𝐴𝑇𝑇 (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors)  -4.37***(1.15) 
Panel C: Covariates’ Balancing 












Propensity Score 0.51 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.59 
Full Cash 0.51 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.53 
Full Stock 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.76 
Diversified 0.37 0.36 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.40 
ln(Acquirer Market Value) 5.99 5.60 0.00 5.83 5.83 0.80 
ln(Deal Value) 3.75 3.52 0.00 3.64 3.63 0.66 
Private 0.51 0.52 0.62 0.52 0.51 0.70 
Subsidiary 0.25 0.24 0.41 0.25 0.25 0.50 
Acquirer Toehold 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.11 




Table 9 PSM analysis on high vs. low MPU 
 
Panel A: Logit model 





























Panel B: Matching Results for CAR 
Matching Algorithm Caliper=0.001 with replacement 
Matched Observations per Treated Deal 1:1 
Number of Treated Observations 5,712 
Number of Control Observations  5,712 
CAR 𝐴𝑇𝑇 (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) -0.81*** (0.27) 
BHAR 𝐴𝑇𝑇 (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors)  2.91***(1.21) 
Panel C: Covariates’ Balancing 












Propensity Score 0.52 0.51 0.00 0.52 0.52 0.11 
Full Cash 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.92 
Full Stock 0.28 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.28 0.63 
Diversified 0.37 0.36 0.53 0.36 0.37 0.62 
ln(Acquirer Market Value) 5.63 5.96 0.00 5.65 5.65 0.97 
ln(Deal Value) 3.49 3.79 0.00 3.46 3.47 0.67 
Private 0.51 0.51 0.93 0.53 0.53 0.83 
Subsidiary 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.92 
Acquirer Toehold 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.63 




Table 10 The effects of the alternative policy uncertainty subcategories on the acquirer CAR 
 
Panel A: The individual wealth effects of different policy subcategories 
 









































Panel B: The wealth effects based on the principal component of the other policy categories 
 
 
The table assesses the uniqueness of the wealth effects associated with MPU relative to other policy categories. Panel A presents the effects of each policy subcategory on 
the acquirer CAR. In assessing the wealth impact of MPU in Panel A, we report the coefficient associated with “Announcement MPU” from Model (1) (Table 4). For the 
wealth effects of the remaining policy categories, we control for the effects of MPU and the other variables in Model (1) (Table 4). In Panel B, we report four models 
including both MPU and the first principal component of the remaining policy categories (PC1 Other). Models (1) and (3) do not include the interactive relationship 
between MPU and the principle component of the remaining policies while Models (2) and (4) control for this interactive effect. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 







Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variable CAR CAR CAR CAR 






Deviation of FFR from Natural Rate 




































Control Factors YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 12,350 12,350 12,350 12,350 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 
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Table 11 The calendar-year effects on CAR 
 
Model (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable CAR CAR 




Deviation of FFR from Natural Rate 
 -0.305*** 
(0.122) 























































p-value (H0: No Calendar Year Effects) 0.08 0.11 
p-value (H0: No Monetary Policy Effect) 0.00 0.00 
Calendar Year Effects YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES 
N 12,350 12.350 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.05 
 
The table presents two models explaining the variation in the acquirer’s CAR while controlling for calendar year fixed 
effects. For each model, we report the p-value from the Wald restriction that the calendar year effects are jointly equal to 0. 
We also report the p-value from the restriction that the effects of monetary policy-related variables (the coefficients of 
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and Announcement period MPU) in Model (1) and the coefficients of Deviation of FFR from 
Natural Rate and Announcement period MPU) in Model (2)) are jointly equal to 0. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 




Table 12 The impact of monetary policy on the use of target termination fees and earnouts 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Model Type OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variables Premium Premium 
Target Term Fee=1 
Otherwise=0 


























































































































































Number of Target Termination Fees 311 311 1,579 1,579 1,579 1,579 
Number of Earnouts 182 182 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2,361 2,361 12,350 12.350 12,350 12.350 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.39 0.39 0.11 0.10 
 
The table presents two OLS regressions explaining the variation in the premium and four logit models predicting the choice of contractual arrangements in the M&As. 
Models (1) and (2) explain the variation in the takeover premium in public target acquisitions. This premium is estimated as in Officer (2003). Models (3) and (4) predict 
the use of target termination fee agreements. The dependent variable in these models is assigned the value of 1 if a target termination fee agreement is present in the deal, 
and 0 otherwise. Models (5) and (6) predict the inclusion of deferred payments (earnout) contracts. The dependent variable is assigned the value of 1 if an earnout is 
present in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description 




Table 13 VAR Model 
 
Dependent Variable 𝑙𝑛(𝑀&𝐴 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑡 
Explanatory Variable\Model (1) 
 Q_FFRt−1 -0.076*** (0.033) 
 Q_MPUt−1 0.003 (0.002) 
 Q_Leading Indext−1 0.090 (0.137) GDP Growtht−1 -0.046 (0.182) 
 ∆CAPEt−1 0.028 (0.052) 
 Policy Uncertaintyt−1 -0.007** (0.003) 





Adjusted R-Squared 0.41 
 
The table presents the equation that explains the variation in the natural logarithm of the M&A dollar value. This equation 
is part of a 7-variable VAR model with one-quarter lags. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
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The figure presents the variation in both the federal funds rate and the natural interest level (two-sided) estimated by 









The figure presents the 12-month rolling averages of the general policy uncertainty and the news-based monetary policy 
uncertainty proxies developed by Baker et al. (2016) from 1986 to 2017. Both proxies are adjusted to have a mean level of 
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The figure presents the response of the natural logarithm of the dollar value of the quarterly M&A activity to one cholseky 
innovation in the federal funds rate from the VAR model presented in Section 4. The impulse response has the following 
ordering of the variables: Fed, ∆CAPE, Leading Index, MPU, Policy Uncertainty, GDP, and ln(M&A Value). It is worth noting 
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